tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 7, 2015 6:00am-8:01am EDT
in this context does indefinitely mean that time period has not been established or does it mean perpetually? >> it means that under this agreement and under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, iran is prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon, updating, acquiring or developing one. ever, ever. >> so it really means --
>> perpetually, yes. >> under the code, does iran have the right to enrich up to weapons grade uranium after the expiration of the cap? >> no. if they indeed move to enriching to what we would consider weapons grade that will raise a red flag to the entire international community, to the iaea. there are very few circumstances where iran needs to for peaceful nuclear purpose of enriching above 5%. one could argue for submarine fuel perhaps but indeed if they went to weapons grade it would raise instantaneous red flags and we would see it as a major noncompliance. >> enrichment over 5% start to essentially raises red flag with the exception of submarine fuel speak with submarine fuel and may be one or two other things. i'm not an expert but i could
ask mike was sitting behind but very few. >> one would be submarine fuel? >> i think it is 20 -- could be 20, some are higher. >> so that's a big distinction between five and 20, but are you basically saying that if the amount of fuel enriched didn't specifically the quality profile of the nuclear submarines, that i would be a red flag? so essentially it's 5%? >> 5% or less. >> in terms of after -- >> the one of the distinction i should make his for the to run research reactor which helps to make medical isotopes for cancer research or cancer treatment in iran uses 20%, but this agreement says that we will provide fabricated fuel for the to run research reactor overtime
-- tehran. we of the controls on the so cannot be used for other purposes. >> how much enriched uranium above 5% code iran star without creating a red flags be quick to point. mr. szubin reminds me for 15 years iran is not allowed under this agreement to enrich beyond 3.67%. so the concern you've raised only begins to raise those red flags after those 15 years. they are allowed for the speakinseekingis to have a stocf 300 kilograms. that is not enough to provide enough this material for nuclear weapons. >> but after the seeking if they can have more than 300 kilograms so there's no particular limit at that point? >> there is not a limit but, of course, begin we would look at an ever-increasing stockpile and understand the reasons and uses of the. one of the things that is very
clear because we have uranium accountancy for 25 years, centrifuge production for 20 years, they have to make a declaration to the iaea of their additional protocols, research and development over the long term, that there will be many, many metrics for measuring what they doing with their program for a very, very long time. >> because my time has expired my last question is, when you look at snap back, it's kind of a sledgehammer approach. given the scale of violations, is there a scalable response? >> yes, senator. we have reserved the right to snapback in whole or in part and that's a quote from the agreement and predicted with her unilateral sanctions, we can do with the u.n. sanctions and the eu has assured similar right. putting back in place in a sector, all the way through to full snapback. >> thank you.
>> senator cotton. >> turn one. i have to note that it was an eight minute exchange between senator schumer and the witnesses about the meaning of the grandfather clause. i think that some can answer out of the but also note administration officials have said repeatedly iran will exploit every ambiguity to their advantage i can only imagine what they will say about that clause if it come to pass. but moving on, secretary sherman, there's a lot of commentary about access, access to iran's nuclear sites, military sites throughout the jcpoa. secretary kerry, secretary moniz have talked about managed access. can you assure us that this access will actually be physical access? iaea inspectors will be physically walking into the site and taking samples or installing equipment? >> i think that every situation is different, senator, and that
the iaea has the capability, the expert knowledge to make sure that whatever they do can be technically authenticated. so i can't go through every hypothetical situation. i know the that director-general amano will get asked this question by our colleagues in singapore relations committee -- but what i am assured of is that whatever they do in every circumstance where they believed they need to access, they will be technically authenticated and eliminate the standards that they must have and that they require for insurance verification. >> the answer that sounds like is no, we cannot be assured that iaea inspectors were physically and personally be present on every -- >> you know, you don't have to be physically present on every site in this technological world to get done what is necessary. our labs can walk you through
those parameters as well. >> who will decide what is and is not a military site? >> well, i think the better way to respond to your question is to say if the iaea believes it has justification of access to the site, we have a process to ensure they get that access, whatever that site is, military or nonmilitary. >> can iran do research universities to be military sites because they have justification to enter any site regardless of what it is an excess of group provides a process to assure they will get access. the united states would not agree to an agreement where access was not assured if the iaea believed it had to have it your that is what we have in this agreement. >> are you aware of actions the government of apprentice didn't get sent i think sensitiv sinces suspected sites since the date of the jcpoa? >> i'm not going to discuss anything that would be considered closely but there's meeting this afternoon and will
be prepared to answer questions. >> let's move to the deals from the iaea and to render you acknowledged that you read the cited groups between the iaea and iran. anyone else in the united states government reduce aggregate speak with yes. some of our experts did as well as all of the p5+1. >> can you give an estimate of how many officials read the site agreement? >> a handful. i would have to stop and think. >> you said earlier to senator corker america on the confidentiality of these agreements between the iaea and a rant but if you've read speed actually it is the iaea in every country with which it is safeguard confidential protocol. >> outcome to the animal but the fact that you have read them under the us government officials have with them, doesn't that undermine the claim of supposedly confidentiality? >> we are showing them in a confidential setting and i will share with the united states senate as i've done with house leadership chairs and rankings
may confidential understanding, and will hopefully keep them in a classified setting. >> how long are these documents the? >> very short. >> like the roadmap is the? >> i would have to stop and think back but a very short. >> why are these document classified? it's not a u.s. government, not recovered, not subject to extensive collection methods. iran knows what degree do. you know what's in it why are these classified? >> so the reason is they are what are called safeguard confidential. under the comprehensive safeguards agreement to which we are also a party, we have confidential safeguard, confidential documents and protocols with the iaea between the united states and the iaea, as do all of the countries that are under the csa. the iaea has committed to keeping them confidential.
and so, therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under tsa confidential as well. >> i'm aware that that is a statement. you also gave senator corker us and you're not implying any kind of moral equivalence between the united states and iran. >> absolutely not. i said to a senator, you are not yet here, senator cotton, that i understood that this was a very turf -- different circumstance and since we can to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and was an international understanding that had been negotiated among the six-party and iran. so yes, i understand this is different circumstance, which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangements, understanding they would be classified, and i made clear to the iaea under our system i would be required to share in a classified confidential setting with members of the united states
congress what i had seen, and i will do so this afternoon. >> did you make it clear that u.s. law, u.s. law was signed in the middle of these negotiations required congress to receive a text of all agreements to include agreement to which the united states is not a party? >> indeed our understanding of the legislation that was passed by the house and senate is that we must give you every document that we have come and we've given you every document that we have spent the legislation says all agreements. it doesn't actually matter whether the united states has it in its possession or not. >> it's very difficult to give you something we do not have. >> did you make that clear to iran and iaea at the time speak what they are quite well aware of our legislation. i pressure they follow you every single the. >> fascinating interview today from secretary kerry and jeffrey, if congress to vote no
on this it would be screwing the ayatollah, and then secretary kerry says that if congress rejects that the original iran quote american is not going to negotiate in good faith but it didn't negotiate in good faith now and that would be the ayatollah's point. surely be made clear to iran that congress had to vote on the day before it could go forward and, therefore, they should not be operating under such a misperception speak was of course the new congress was going to vote on mr. everything was very public. everything that happened here in our country is transparent, democratic and public and we are very proud of that. >> are you concerned about congress during the ayatollah? >> i have not seen his energy. i'm not going to comment on it. what i will comment on is that secretary kerry, secretary moniz, myself, the negotiating team have been working diligently on this for over two years, having previously united states senate and congress countless times, hundreds of times quite frankly, did
everything they could to ensure the safety and security of the united states, that's our solemn obligation and that's what we did. >> thank you. >> senator warner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm going to start by simply saying i appreciate what you've been doing. i think many of us have concerns about components of the deal. many of us are like the monday morning quarterback but i find it remarkable that some members seem to mq that you were not there trying to get the best deal possible for the united states of america, and our long-term prospects of stability in the region. i may agree or not agree with what you negotiated and i've got more due diligence to do, but i would never question the approach you took or the dedication that you have taken and is processed.
mr. szubin, clear your actions, both administrations working on this brings a lot of history and commitment, and i believe you want to make sure that we follow up, particular on iranian actions to stabilize actions in the region. i do want to continue on what senator sasse asked about what would happen if we don't act your there are some who put forward a theory because, had said if the united states congress terms of this agreement down, that iran would still come with still be in iran's best interest to go through implementation date so that, together nuclear stockpiles, and some parts of the reactor so they could still obtain 50 billion plus dollars and affect isolate america since the rest of the world would be otherwise online.
you want to comment on the theory? >> senator, obviously it's always dangerous to speculate about how cement plant, especially highly complex international scenarios like the one you're describing. deployed made earlier is important industry fac that whit isn't a black or white answer. the u.s. were to retain our sanction because congress rejects the deal and certainly for our part within implement the sanctions, that is our obligation to do, we would still see some international enforcement, whether it's on the oil slick, on the reserves site. that would begin to erode a special in the snare your describe where iran actually goes through with its commitments in order to isolate us, to show they are not a good actor to comply with all the commitments and the u.s. is the one who walked away. that's a snare i very much hope thait doesn't occur but it woule terrible for us in terms of our
sanction, in terms of our credibility. when the exercise of these authorities, extraordinary authorities, we need to do so in a way that's meaningful and where people don't we are ready to act. i very much hope it doesn't come to that. it would be a situation of we can leverage. it will not be zero, not 100% but weakened and the question then is could we turn we can leverage into a much stronger deal? my assessment is no. >> ambassador sherman, any other comment speak as i couldn't agree more. in fact, if we walk away, even if we retain some sanctions capability, and we will of course enforce our laws, the rest of the world will go in another direction. and more importantly iran will go in another direction and the president of the united states, whether it is president obama are the next president of the united states will face -- >> but there's a separate premise, with a walkway immediately or go through the
publication date. we don't know but -- >> i doubt very certainly, if the united states sanctions remain in place, iran will proceed that we've walked away from the deal and they no longer have to stick with it. >> to questions. i will try to stay within my time. one is that, one of the concerns is the administration did say when congress for tougher sanctions and move forward, switch notions, using the swift system it was reluctant from the administration about us taking that step. i think in retrospect taking that step was important, effective and help tighten down the sanctions. i do wonder if we don't move forward though, you know, will we be prepared to move forward with those same sanction, particularly as we look at sanctioning the bank of korea, the bank of japan, comments on that? >> i'd like to get one last question recognizing everybody
has got a little overtime. >> it's a very stark scenario that you're depicting because the institution you're talking about are some of the most significant and fundamental institutions and international financial sector, whether it's swift who is the leading messaging company for banks worldwide, whether it's the largest commercial banks in korea, india, the central bank of japan. the prospect of us having to our sanctions authorities against those entities is frightening. >> but if we chose to reject it, that would be our policy? >> it within the threatening those institutions unless they come along with the u.s. approach on this. >> let me just get my last question in. a statement you made earlier, i think further exploration on i got to the 24 days, i was surprised at first about that time, still have some concern but lisa have a little more
clarification. one of the things that you said and i think it's an artful process you created, not unlike other members of permanent council to have a veto. we in effect have a default veto. but what kind of assurance can we really have that our current eu partners and friends in uk for example, if, in germany, if they engage in a major way with iran on a basis basis going forward, that they will stick with us, how do we get more comfort around that? >> i think that this comfort is the one that acting under sectaries up and gave which is in 2012 we were in the same circumstance where, in fact, europe have lots of business with iran, a lot of businesses in iran and they were very concerned about iran having a nuclear weapon and moving down that pathway into the joint is enforcement of not on our unilateral sanctions but under own sanctions and multilateral
sanctions and, in fact, enforcement and companies like siemens and others all had to leave. >> i'd like to more particularly from our european allies on that matter. >> i would urge you to speak with him directly but i think you get the right answer you were looking for. >> senator warren? >> mr. chairman, if i could i would like to yield to senator don and come back when it is my turn. >> thank you. i want to thank senator warren for her kindness on that and thank you both for your hard work. in regards to parchin and the iaea agreement, moving ahead in parchin and every other facility, is it your understanding that they iaea can get into every facility that if they choose to, that they can go
in there physically themselves as opposed to having iran turn over materials? that they have physical access? >> i'd be happy to get into this in greater detail in a classified session, senator. what i can tell you is that whatever the iaea ladies that it needs to do to have a technically authenticated result, for whatever access to the belief they need to have, they will get it. >> if they believe they need to physical access to a place, that will not be denied? >> as i said, whatever they believe they need for a technically authenticated process, they will get under the agreements that we have negotiated here, and i'll be glad to discuss this in greater and more explicit detail in a classified setting. >> we can talk this afternoon but this sounds like a yes to
me. is the reason to believe there's any other documents out there? >> no. if there are i don't know about them. >> okay. have you asked a iaea if there are any other documents out there? spirit i have not asked them specifically but i did see the director-general when he arrived here yesterday, we talked. i asked him questions about where we were with the various things and i've no reason to believe there's any other documents. >> have you asked the iranians believe that these discussions with, do you have any other agreements with anybody else at this time that we don't know about? >> i have not asked that question explicitly, but given the hours and hours we spent together, i do not revert any other documents. >> i think that is a question well worth asking as we move forward. mr. szubin, the alternative
theory that has been put out there, one of the alternative scenarios is that the united states walks away, and then we in effect go country by country saying make a choice economically, to deal with iran or else we will sanction, in effect we will not deal with your economy. what is the likeliness of that kind of scenario having success? >> in the event of us walking away from this deal, i think we would be very much swimming against the tide. because the cooperation we obtained to date in going around the world just as you described in sync when you can pressure iran was predicated on a diplomatic path. and so china, india, south korea, here's a good way to testament to see if they're ready to make a deal. in this context we would be
walking away from that. >> i apologize because time is limited. so if we walk away, what is left in terms of strength of sanctions? some folks have said we sought significant impact on iran at that time. what is left, we know we will to sanctions in place, what other global effects will take place speak with the u.s. as you note would retain our unilateral sanctions, basically our primary embargo on every remains in place and that's frankly true notwithstanding the deal gave away. our embargo is going to remain in place. the eu has sanctions with respect to iran's activity outside nuclear, terrorism, human rights, those would remain in place but most severe economic sanctions and we've spent time talking up-to-date and that congress helped to put in place affect things like iran's sale of crude oil,
petrochemicals and assets of us in the back of vibrant, the banking system internationally, those are all built on the threat of u.s. sanctions with international acquiescence. that acquiescence that i fear will be risking. >> the alternative suggestion is about for countries who are not willing to also continued their sanctions if we walk away, and we go to them and say make a choice. how realistic is that? >> i think would be a very tough conversation, and to think when you're going to a country like china or india telling them we're going to dictate where you buy your oil from, which is what frankly we've been doing for the last few years, they're going to say with an eye on what? what is your prospect for getting a nuclear deal so we can lift the sanctions? if you think our bar having moved the goalpost, sorry to mix sports metaphors but that our bar is on realistic eye, i think
we'll have a hard time securing the cooperation enemies are sanctions leverage will erode considerably. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, ambassador sherman and undersecretary szubin for your work. i think ago. understands that a nuclear-armed iran threatens the united states, threatens israel, threatens the entire world. the question now before congress, and the only question before congress is whether nuclear agreement negotiated alongside other countries represents our best available option for preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. i wonder if you can fool some of the pieces together and evaluate the options. what happens if we go forward with a steel versus what happened if we back out? let's start with the tough sanctions imposed by the united states with the cooperation of other countries around the world such as the uk, france, china,
russia, germany, the eu. if we reject this do we need our international partners to continue the tough sanctions, refuse to trade with iran, block iran's access to the frozen assets in order to be effective. so ambassador sherman, if we walk away, do you believe that all the other nations that have endorsed this deal are likely to continue working with us to impose strong sanctions against iran? >> no, because as acting undersecretary szubin said, the recent to cooperate with because we were pursuing a diplomatic solution and they thought that was worth trying to accomplish. that has now been accomplished. so they believed it was worth taking the economic hit they all did to do that, but if we walk away from what they considered to be a good view, 90 countries have spoken out in support of that deal, they will believe that we've changed the equation. we have not operated in good
faith, and we are on our own. >> what happens if we are on our own. at the united states continues sanctions on our own while other nations resume trade with iran, how effective will our sanctions likely be? >> they will be less effective than they are today. >> all right. so thank you. now consider the roughly $50 billion of iran's money that's frozen and could be granted to koran as part of sanctions relief if iran complies with the deal. undersecretary szubin let me ask, if most recent a very significant part of this $50 billion held in the united states? >> no. >> if we walk away, do you believe the other countries that hold of this money will continue to keep it out of iran's hans? >> i think we will begin to see those funds be released if iran
stays and starts meeting its commitments under the deal? >> but the question i ask is if we walk away from the deal, are you convinced that of the countries that hold of these funds are going to continue to withhold those funds from iran? >> i can't guarantee you that they will. >> let's talk next about iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. ambassador sherman, if we reject this deal and iran decide to build nuclear weapons, what would be iran's breakout time? that is, how long do you estimate it would take iran to produce enough that you for a nuclear weapon speak with the assessment is two to three months. >> two to three months. and if we accepted this deal and if iran complies with it, what would be iran's breakout time? >> at least for 10 years, one year. >> okay. let's next think about cheating.
iran may signed a deal and then tried to develop a nuclear bomb anyway. so ambassador sherman, would it be easier for us or harder for us to detect a secret iranian nuclear weapons program if we accept the deal or if we reject the deal? >> clearly if we accept the deal will have any more eyes on the iaea, not only have access to declared sides in arak but also serve as over uranium, the entire supply chain, they will have eyes on centrifuge production. they will have access to undeclared sites in to suspicious sites if they believe there is a justification. much of that, most of it, nearly all of that will disappear if there is no deal. >> i have just one more question on this. let's talk about war. i don't think americans want to be dragged into another war in the middle east but let's face are factored if we reject this deal iran's breakout time will
go down and that will increase the pressure to take military action very soon. what i want to compare here is the effectiveness of these two options. negotiated options versus military options. in the long-term which action is likely to be more effective at preventing iran from developing a nuclear bomb, accepted the agreement and closely monitor iran's nuclear program, or reject the agreement and if there's escalation, bomb iran? which one is more likely to be effective? >> clearly a long-term negotiated solution which is what we have in the joint comprehensive plan of action is more effective because if we take military action, which the president of the united states will do it is actually no choice, indeed wil the only setk to program it is rated by intelligence community two to three years because iran has the know-how. they have mastered the entire
cycle to create fissile material for a nuclear weapon and so, therefore, although we could bomb away their facilities, they could reconstruct them. you cannot bomb away knowledge. you cannot sanction the way knowledge. the only way to control is a negotiated solution that is highly monitored and verified. that is what we've negotiated. >> thank you. some have said they want a better deal but that is not the choice that congress faces. the deal is with the deal, and congress has two choices. accept it or reject it. no one can say for certain that this deal will prevent a nuclear-armed iran, and i won't say it. but no one has put a better more realistic alternative on the table, and until i hear a better option, i intend to support this deal. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator heitkamp. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, thank you for your patience today. i think this is such an important issue and this committee has unique jurisdiction and i watched as
you click members really get to the heart of what they need to examine and i want to personally thank you for that. there's a lot of attempts to an bake the cake, right? i've been summoned has been engaged in multiparty negotiations including some of the large civil settlements that this country has seen. i know difficult it is to undertake a cake. i think elizabeth, senator warren just took us through the paces in terms of what real options are. but i will do the one thing i don't believe has the dot dot dot is effectively than the sanctions regime will, in fact, build a bigger, better, more economically stable i ran into the future. as long as iran is on the terrorism list that creates incredible opportunity. as i think mr. secretary, you
have so appropriately talk about the challenges that they have economically today. if, in fact, a sanctions regime is lifted and we look 10 years into the future, iran is going to be a much more stable economic target i don't think there's any doubt about it. this may seem off-topic for some people but it is on topic for me. the one thing that we could do that would provide competition against and iran that has the ability to market their oil into the market, and have the resulting economic growth as result of marketing that oil is actually exporting american oil, to beat without iranian oil. it's difficult in my state to explain why we should lift sanctions on iran when we are sanction in the united states of america in terms of our oil export. i'd like to hear from both the state department and the department of treasury your response to that statement,
specially looking into the future in 10 years women know that that competition could, in fact, could curtail the economic might of an enemy. >> thank you for the question. unfortunate i'm not the right treasury official to speak to restrictions on sales of american oil spewed by judy manage the sanctions and that is a big part of it. as part of the job of managing the sanctions is to look at how the sanctions have an impact on the viability economic of iran. you kind of par for the the right guy to ask. >> what i can say with respect to the sanctions is your right. what's envisioned under this deal is to relate some of the second or pressure, not the u.s. sanctions against iran that a bilateral sanctions but the second or pressure internationally on iran's economy. if iran adheres to all of its commitments iran can expect some economic recovery. i think it's going to be many,
many years in the making before iran gets back to where it ought to have otherwise been today. but -- >> but you do understand there's a lot of concern about an economical empower iran and what that means to stability in the region speak was i understand it to my very core. >> i think the chairman has been generous with all of us so i would turn to you, ambassador sherman. >> senator, i think neither adam nor myself can comment on u.s. domestic policy, the wiki will understand how you his domestic policy has a profound impact on international relations and markets. so i'm sure that particular interest that you have, that we all have in american economic, security and independence when it comes to oil and gas is something that has to be resolved. >> but there's been a lot written about the ability to provide some kind of energy security into europe that could, in fact, be one of those soft
power measures. >> absolutely. >> i understand this might be above your pay grade or whatever it is but i just want acknowledgment american oil moving into international markets has the effect of curtailing the economic power of iran, the economic power of russian and whole lot of people or nation-states there really are not friends of this country, and this is an opportunity to give our allies a step forward and energy security that may, in fact, strengthen the sanctions regime and the effect we have a step back. >> i think no one would disagree energy security for our country, for the world and for that matter to you with issues of climate and how we manage that will have a profound impact on the development of countries and america continue to be the preeminent economy in the world. no question. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
>> senator vitter. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to both of you for being here and for your service. ms. sherman, i wanted to follow up on an important issue that i think my colleague senator scott got into. and that is these two significant secret iaea agreements. they are certain significant in terms of enforcing this agreement, are they not? >> i would say they are important arrangements on the modalities that the iaea would use but i believe the public roadmap which you all have access to place out what they iaea is requiring of iran in broad terms as one of the steps that must take in order to get any sanctions relief along with all the other nuclear steps. although i agree that possible military dimensions are important, they are.
the united states authority make its judgment about it so we are much more focused on what the program is today and where it is headed in the future, which is what the bulk of the joint comprehensive plan of action is about. >> you decide what's available to members of the senate and the public is laying things out in broad terms. aren't the real specific verification, very significant in judging disagreements because of cores speed at which you agree or not? >> of course they are and that is why deep breathing the second i will share in a classified session the details that i'm aware of the arrangements that have been made under safeguard confidential protocols between iran and the iaea. >> you have read those two secret agreements of? >> i have read those to safeguard arrangements, yes. >> okay. when do i get to read and speak with you won't, sir, anyone in the country will get to read the
safeguard confidential protocol between the united states and the iaea. >> do you have a vote on this agreement speak with i do not obviously. >> i have a vote on this. you think it's appropriate that i would get to read -- you have read these agreements, and i think that's appropriate i'm not arguing with that. i have to vote on this agreement. you don't think it's appropriate that i would get to read it? >> as i said to the iaea and to all of my colleagues, that i would have to share the arrangement in a classified session with the united states -- >> that's not my question to do you think it's appropriate that i don't get you read it when i have to vote on it? >> you have to make your own judgment about it. spent i'm asking your opinion. >> my opinion is it's in the united states security agreement that could be a comprehensive safeguard protocol and that those protocols remain confidential.
that is in our national security interest. >> do you think it's appropriate that i as a sitting u.s. senator representing significant number of americans who have to vote on this, did not get to read those agreements? not talk about putting them on the internet. not talk about handing out -- >> i don't have those agreements to give to you. >> that was not my question. please answer my question. do you think it's appropriate that i don't get everything? >> i think that the system is been put in place that maintains these as confidential documents between the iaea and the countries with which it operates under the comprehensive safeguards agreement is appropriate. >> and under the appropriate system, you get to read although you don't have a vote. i don't get to read it although i do have a vote. okay, let me move on. president obama earlier said, in your 13, 14 and your 15, iran has advanced centrifuges that
enrich uranium fairly rapidly. at that point the breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero, closed quote. is that accurate? >> indeed what is accurate is that -- >> is that quote accurate? >> in those years they will not come down to zero, no. >> what will he come down to? >> we can discuss that in a classified session. >> his quote was almost down to zero. >> i know. it is almost -- i know it is not almost down to zero. for those years it is literally technically impossible for enrichment to go down to literally zero. it's just not possible. that's what the candidate it is two to three months. >> two to three months, okay, so maybe something comparable to that. and context do you think that other middle eastern countries
will strongly consider developing nuclear weapons of? >> i do not. and it is the intelligence community assessment that they will not. >> to a layperson, that makes no sense. to a layperson when you have a radical, dangerous regime which has the capability within months of having nuclear weapons, it is not credible that everybody is just going to sit on their hands. so explain to me why that judgment would be credible. >> first of all to build a nuclear weapon in not going to fizzle material which today the breakup target to three months under this agreement. it would be a year or of his tenured which give us plenty of time to understand what's going on and to act if we need to take action but you also have to weaponize that material and yet have a delivery system. it is the assessment of our community that even if iran were able to enrich your into fissile material for a bomb, which it does not have today ever take
some time for them to get, that they would indeed still be some maybe as much as a year or two away from getting a nuclear weapon if, in fact, they have a program for weaponize and that of a system to carry it as again as a title that my question i'm not talking about today. i'm talking about assuming they live under the agreement, in the later years those time frames considerably shortened? >> the fissile material timeframe is jordan. we are not come we have to ask the intelligence committee, i'm not aware of a current weaponization program, a program that there is a bomb with a delivery system and i've been. i expect that, in fact, they could do that should to make the decision to do that. but your question was about of the country and it didn't get to that and i apologize. i believe that the country will go to because it's expensive. very expensive. secondly, we would know about
it. they would find themselves under the intense sanctions that iran has been under because some of the country that you are talking about our partners or allies of ours and are trying to deal with aspects of state sponsorship of terrorism of the right and what work with us to do that and we are working with them to do the. i believe there are a number of both incentives and disincentives for this countries to choose not to move in the direction that iran has moved in. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman. >> this has been a long hearing, an interesting hearing. i just have a few short observations. what is, it's been brought up, what is and what is not integrated is very important, is it not, mr. szubin? but if you don't have all of the information, it's hard to discern what is in an agreement. my question to both of you, we know the history of iran.
we know what's at stake. ambassador sherman, do you trust iran speak was of course not. >> mr. szubin? >> no. spirit we are entered into an agreement here of some of great importance with the country that we don't trust, that we have reason to believe is going to cheat or do whatever they have to. spent they are not close magnetic at least a year or two years away from a nuclear weapon should they decide to pursue one. it is not apparent that this agreement has made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. it's two to three months right now breakout for fissile material spent fissile material speak with the yes. under this agreement that would change to a year. >> which is a big step.
>> huge step. >> mr. szubin, do you trust iran to forgo their terrorist activity and not spend any of his money that they would get, we say $50 billion, on promoting terrorism and unrest all over the world of? >> mr. chairman, i do not trust iran and to think we could be nearly certain that are in is going to continue to sponsor terrorism and groups like the quds force. that's what it's and, upon us to intensify our campaign against the that. >> strange agreement. thank you both for your patience and for your appearance before the committee. we have another parent i know it's a long day, very important. i'll call them up. our witnesses for the second they'll today includes the honorable juan zarate, senior advisor for the transnational threats project at the center for strategic and international
studies. mr. mark dubowitz, director of the foundation for defense of democracies, and dr. matthew levitt, director of the stein program on counterterrorism and intelligence at the washington institute for near east policy, and ambassador nicholas burns, roy and barbara goodman family professor of diplomacy and international relations at harvard university, john f. kennedy school of government. we welcome all of you here. to the banking committee and all of use with investment will be made part of the hearing record in its entirety, and when we get seated we will proceed. mr. zarate spoke like a karate
but with ac. yes, sir. we will start with you, sir. when you're ready. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member brown, distinguished them as the committee, i'm honored to testify before you to discuss the sanctions applications of the iran nuclear agreement. i approach to be testify with my petal panelists whose work i've admired for years. i take this responsibility seriously, given the gravity and applications of this agreement. i come to this issue we could use a port experience dealing with iran and the treasury department to the national security council. i know all involved including my good friend and former colleague adam zubin the juice testified have been working incredibly hard towards a peaceful solution to the iranian nuclear problem. trying to the financial and economic campaign which is no will and has been a part of, but methodical the course of a decade thanks to the innovative work of patriots like ambassador
burns help bring iran to the table. in the words of president rouhani, the sanctions threat to drive iran backed into the stone age. these efforts it's important have also been designed to constrain and isolate world diving behavior, support to terrorism, the assad regime, human rights abuses as those to protect the integrity of the is an international financial systems. unfortunately, the sanctions would framework is flawed. everly is too frontloaded, it does i go for the increased risks stemming from hiring commercial and financial activity and overly constrains the us government's ability to use effective financial power against iranian non-nuclear national security risks. to our structural problems in these agreement to step back as a blunt instrument. gaming is making a heckler's veto on any nuclear scientific agreement unwind the sanctions to broadly. it may put the u.s. in a position of rehabilitating
iran's economy. mr. chairman, significant agreement creates an international process that now subject to u.s. sanctions to review. mason the about processes, in u.s. sanctions are related action to which iran objects would be subject to review by the other party including iran, china and russia. we potentially converted the iran sanctions program into one in which the target has a neat right to challenge an international venue in which to do it. this will be done with the support of parties that do not like i want the city is that he financial power and influence. and may even drive a wedge between the u.s. and europe moving forward. at a minimum all this will temper our financial toast against iran. mr. chairman, this. the letter of the agreement may neuter usability leverage our financial power in the future. from the start of negotiations with the reins wanted most was the ability to do business again i'm fettered and unplugged back
into the global system. the regime has been access to banking, shipping, insurance, new technologies and connectivity to global markets. that is what de-loft over the past decade, that appears to what they have gained in guaranteed in this deal. u.s. money to amplify pages of financial measures aggressively against the comments of the a ring economy to do with increased risks of it is not at all but this is well understood by all parties or even part of our strategy. and we have the ability to do so unilaterally if need. the united states has been shaping a link efforts to isolate iran and enforced sanctions since 2005 at the sanction regime has not been faltering. on the contrary iran's isolation by virtue of their own actions and market reaction is increased over time. there's been increase in risk aversion to doing business with iran because of the underlying
conduct that engages in as well as the people of the revolutionary guard, the mullahs and the regime controlling strategic elements of the economy. the responsible private sector actors will not rush and immediately. waiting to understand that the sanctions will unwind, where the iran will adhere to the deal and their own risks. risk from iran are real and will increase from care financing and proliferation to corruption and illicit financing. these risks will help keep -- the private sector as well will be watching and listening to you into congress which can affect the global environment and the reach of our financial power in the future. there are three principal for congress to demand related to the steel and to sanction. congress should ensure there is clarity and implication and in particular the execution of any sanctions unwinding plan. it should ensure the u.s. maintained as much financial and economic power as possible. congress should mitigate the
risks attendant to an arrest and emboldened regime in tehran. these principles that could help inform a new strategy to address the dangers risk stemming from iran to u.s. could and should adopt aggressive financial constriction campaign focusing on the revolutionary guard and the the revolutionary guard and a core element of the regime that engage in terrorist financing, proliferation and human rights abuses. this could include secondary sanctions. the should every commitment to the elements of a nonproliferation regime focus on iran, reinforce our financial measures against the iranian banks using section 311 of the patriot act. the global attributes expansively to target finances and holdings of giving and receiving and those involving gross human rights violations on its behalf. these are just some of the measures that could be taken to confront the risk from iran and shape a new sanctions framework. just very quickly, when president rouhani came back to the negotiating table, a western diplomat based in tehran should
we think that we had won the war using economic sanctions and financial pressure. but then he asked, can you win the peace? i think answer to help we can still win the peace but it will require using and leveraging the very same powers and authorities had to bring the regime to the table. we must ensure this agreement is not inevitably empower the regime in tehran and taken one of america's most potent powers off the table. thank you, mr. chairman. >> chairman shelby, ranking member brown, members, thank you for inviting me to testify particularly with these three great experts. the iran nuclear deal is deeply flawed the apple address two of its most serious design defects, sunset clause and the nuclear snap back. the sunset clause permits critical nuclear armed ballistic missiles restriction to disappear over a five to 15 year period. iran has to abide by the agreement to emerge as a
threshold nuclear power with industrial sized enrichment program news or breakout time in peace or clandestine catholic, icbms, access other weaponry and an economy increasingly immunized against future economic pressure. if we learned today it sounds like from under secretary sherman the iaea weapons inspector will not get physical access to all military sites. as iran grows more powerful america's ability of people economic leverage diminishes. this is result of an additional fatal flaw in the agreement that provides a than with what i told a nuclear snap back. the agreement notes if sanctions are imposed on the or in part in response to iranian nuclear noncompliance iran will do that as ground to avoid the debate it complains and contains an explicit requirement by u.s. and eu to do nothing to interfere with the normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. i call thi this the newquist tht back because of rain will use these provisions to threaten to
walk away from the deal and vacation nuclear escalation to iran will likely target for europeans to intimidate them, not to support the position of any sanctions on any ground to risk provoking nuclear escalation a potential worker -- potential war. it will also stymie the dispute resolution process governed by a joint commission. administration isn't even if russia and china were to take iran's side in the dispute washington could count on the votes of germany, france and britain as well as the eu representatives. this majority since one european vote will not change in the face of a renewed nuclear intimidation. while the u.s. can unilaterally to impose u.n. security council sanctions over the objections of china and russia, mr. chairman, would he do so without european support? europe will have a strong economic incentive not to join
the u.s. and snapping back sanction. as a european companies invest, pressure not to reimpose sanctions will grow. the same dynamics apply to the -- on july 20 iran was a statement to the security council that it quote me reconsider its commitment under the agreement if new sanctions are imposed irrespective of whether such a new sanctions are introduced on nuclear related or other grounds, and could iran be able to use this newquist that back threat to prevent washington from combating iran's support for terrorism or human rights abuses. in the face of the ran, would you agree to reimpose terrorism sanctions of the central bank of iran if it was found to be financing terrorism but i'm doubtful given the deterrent powers every nuclear snap back. nuclear snap back to previous, use economic pressure to stop iran, military force may become the only option as a result i said his group may make war with iran are likely not less likely.
wind that comes iran will be stronger and the consequences will be much more severe. but there is an alternative and it isn't war and it's not about killing the deal. it's about a better deal or congress should require the administration to amend his agreements clauses. once the amendment restrictions iran's nuclear program accident elaborate and ballistic missiles should remain and to the u.n. security council where america retains its veto determined that iran's nuclear program is not a threat. one key amendment. the u.s. and europe should -- so we don't need to snap back anything there, which will still be in place. there's ample precedent statement as to the congress have rejected our part amendments to about 200 bilateral and multilateral international agreements including significant cold war arms control agreements with the soviets. at a time when moscow had
thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles aimed at our cities. if congress rejects this deal china and russia may return to some -- europe is tehran's big economic prospects aqp dias diplomatic persuasion and just financial sanction to keep the europeans out of iran. few european banks are going to risk penalties other ability to transact in dollars. european energy companies will find the financial pathways into iran stay me. will never again have the kind of powerful use sanctuary leverage as we do today. we should use it to get key amendment to this deal. those amendments will know the risk of a future war against a much more powerful and dangerous iran. thank you, mr. chairman. ..